

TAB I I  
BACKGROUND PAPERS





## THE 1948 ELECTION

Going into the 1948 election President Truman was in relatively good political shape. He had the approval of 55% of those polled by George Gallup. At the same time (September 1947) Gallup reported that the Democratic Party was preferred by 56% of the respondents to his poll.

Nevertheless there were elements in the liberal wing of the Democratic Party who were uneasy and sought out General Dwight D. Eisenhower as their candidate. However, the General unequivocally removed himself from any political consideration.

Truman began his campaign early -- before the convention. In June he whistle-stopped for two weeks across Ohio, Indiana, Nebraska, Wyoming, Idaho, Montana, Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, New Mexico, Kansas, Missouri, Illinois, Indiana, Pennsylvania and Maryland. His theme was the sorry record of the Republican "80 worst Congress". Following the Convention Truman called the Congress back into session on July 25. He submitted an eight-point program to keep prices down, an increased minimum wage bill, a housing bill, a civil rights bill and other proposals. The Congress played into his hands by failing to act on any of the measures and adjourned within two weeks, thus giving Truman more ammunition to attack the 80th Congress.

On September 17, Truman began his whistle-stop assault on the Congress that continued without interruption until election eve.

Following the Democratic National Convention in July Gallup's survey showed:

Dewey	48%
Truman	37%
Wallace	5%
No opinion	10%

One month later in a survey conducted during the third week of August with the undecideds eliminated, Gallup reported:

Dewey	54.0%
Truman	40.5%
Wallace	5.5%



At the end of September Gallup found:

Dewey	46%
Truman	40%
Wallace	4%
Thurmond	2%
Undecided	8%

On November 1 Gallup published his final poll which was conducted between October 15 and 25:

Dewey	49.5%
Truman	44.5%
Wallace	4 %
Thurmond	2 %

The election results were

Truman	49.5%
Dewey	45.1%
Others	5.4%

Gallup attributes his error to forecast accurately the election results to his failure to poll right up to election eve. At the time of his final poll, 8.7% were still undecided. He explained that "because of apathy shown in the campaign it was assumed that most of the undecideds would not vote.... Not only did many of them vote but they voted overwhelmingly for Mr. Truman."

President Truman's upset victory was, of course, largely of his own making. But, his Republican opponent, Thomas E. Dewey, contributed his share to it because he ran a don't-rock-the-boat campaign that dealt in bland generalities that ignored Truman's charges. Dewey did not make a major address until September 20. Dewey and the Republicans assumed that the polls were correct and that Truman would be hurt by the defection of the solid South to the Dixiecrats and that Henry Wallace would drain traditional left-liberal support.

After the election various explanations were offered for Dewey's defeat. Dewey's overconfidence caused many Republican voters to fail to vote, thinking their votes were not needed. The civil rights fight at the Democratic Convention, followed by the walk-out of the Dixiecrats, led to a heavy black vote for Truman in Illinois, California and Ohio. In those three states Truman won by 33,000, 18,000 and 7,000 votes respectively.

MORAL: Neither bore the electorate nor take it for granted.



1952

At the end of 1951 President Truman had reached his nadir in approval ratings -- only 23% thought he was handling his job well, 58% disapproved and 19% had no opinion - a large figure. The Truman Administration had been engulfed in corruption, bogged down in the Korean War, and charged with softness on Communism - domestic and foreign. In March Truman announced he would not seek reelection.

The Democrats nominated Adlai Stevenson and the Republicans war hero General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who in the intervening four years discovered that he was indeed a Republican.

Following the two conventions Gallup found Eisenhower leading Stevenson 47% to 41% with 12% undecided.

Midway in the campaign between September 28 and October 2, Gallup found the following:

Eisenhower	50%
Stevenson	38%
Undecided	12%

In his final poll, conducted October 28 to November 1 Gallup reported:

Eisenhower	47%
Stevenson	40%
Undecided	13%

With the undecided votes allocated 2-1 to the Democrats:

Eisenhower	51%
Stevenson	49%

With the votes allocated 3-1 for the Democrats:

Eisenhower	50%
Stevenson	50%

The election results:

Eisenhower	55.1%
Stevenson	44.4%



Eisenhower began his campaign on September 1. He traveled a total of 50,376 miles by air and rail through 45 states with stops in 232 towns and cities. His issues were those so generously provided by the Truman Administration. Stevenson could not address these issues, nor defend them so he ran against Herbert Hoover. The issue that clinched the election for Ike was his proposal to go to Korea and take a first-hand look at that bogged-down effort.

Gallup in his post-campaign analysis attributed Eisenhower's victory to:

- (1) His phenomenal popularity
- (2) His decision to campaign in the South
- (3) The Korean War issue
- (4) Women and young voters
- (5) Independent voters -- 54% of whom supported the General

MORAL: If you are going to grin your way through a campaign, it is well to have a solid record that belies strength behind the amiable exterior.



1956

On September 23, 1955, President Eisenhower had a coronary occlusion. Just prior to this, August 25-30, Gallup conducted a trial heat between the President and Stevenson. The results:

Eisenhower	59%
Stevenson	37%

In a poll conducted October 6-11, 62% Gallup's respondents said that Eisenhower would not be a candidate in 1956. At the same time 56% said they would vote for Eisenhower if his doctors say it is all right for him to run.

On February 29, 1956, President Eisenhower made a television address to the nation and told it he would accept the Republican nomination if it was offered to him. But he also said "...every delegate...is entitled to know now that...I shall, in general, wage no political campaign in the customary pattern."

Reporting on a survey conducted March 8-12, Gallup said that Eisenhower had Stevenson by 61% to 37% with only 2% undecided.

On June 7 Eisenhower had an attack of lleitis and had to undergo a serious emergency operation.

Following this Gallup reported that 73% of his respondents thought President Eisenhower would be a candidate and 62% said they would vote for him; 35% supported Stevenson and 3% were undecided.

In the first trial heat following the conventions, Gallup found Eisenhower-Nixon at 52%; Stevenson-Kefauver 41% with 7% undecided. A month later, September 9-14, the figures were exactly the same. However, in a survey conducted September 20-25 Gallup found:

Eisenhower-Nixon	57%
Stevenson-Kefauver	36%
Undecided	7%



In his semi-final election analysis reported November 4, Gallup said Eisenhower would get 55% of the vote.

In his final poll, conducted October 30-November 2, Gallup predicted:

Eisenhower-Nixon	57%
Stevenson-Kefauver	39%
Others	1%
Undecided	3%

The election results:

Eisenhower-Nixon	57.4%
Stevenson-Kefauver	42.0%

Although President Eisenhower had said he would not campaign heavily, he did travel to 13 states and logged 13,600 miles. The Republicans campaigned on the theme "Peace, Progress and Prosperity." Stevenson, since there was little in the domestic arena to attack, chose to campaign on an end to the draft and a cessation of atomic bomb testing. Unfortunately for Stevenson, there was worker unrest in Poland which ultimately ignited a revolution in Hungary on October 23. The revolt, after 12 days of fighting, was brutally put down by the Russian army. As if this were not enough, on October 29, Israel invaded the Sinai Peninsula, France and Britain landed forces November 5-6. It is interesting to note that in a Gallup poll taken September 7, 1952, only 9% of the voters thought Stevenson could handle the Korean situation better than Eisenhower. In a post-election summary, Gallup reported that the most frequent reason given for voting for President Eisenhower was the belief that he could best handle the international crisis, keep us out of war and deal with Russia.

MORAL: If you expect to defeat any opponent, don't attack him at his strongest point.



1960

In his post-1956 election poll, Gallup queried Stevenson voters on their reasons for voting for him. Gallup listed eight reasons given in order of frequency. Number eight on this list was: "Eisenhower's health would not hold up and they did not like Nixon."

Nevertheless, Nixon did receive the enthusiastic support of Republicans who, according to Gallup, was the choice of 67% of the Republicans. Rockefeller ran a poor second with 19%. Bowing to the inevitable, Rockefeller announced on Christmas Eve that he would not be a candidate. This left all the drama on the Democratic side where John Kennedy, Hubert Humphrey were fighting it out in the primaries. There were additional unannounced candidates including Lyndon B. Johnson, Stevenson and Stuart Symington.

In his first poll in January 1960, Gallup found Nixon leading Kennedy 53% to 47%. But by April Kennedy led Nixon 54% to 46%.

Following the Party conventions the choice of Gallup's interviewees was as follows:

Nixon-Lodge	50%
Kennedy-Johnson	40%
Undecided	6%

Nixon, in his acceptance speech, had promised a 50-state campaign -- something no nominee had ever tried before (or since). He had an advantage over his Democratic opponents because Johnson in his pre-Convention machinations had scheduled the Congress to be in session following the conventions. Meanwhile, Nixon, within ten days after his nomination had visited Illinois, Rhode Island, California, Hawaii and Washington. His theme: "Experience Counts." In August Nixon struck his knee on the door of an automobile and sustained a serious infection that caused him to be hospitalized from August 29 to September 9. Meanwhile the Congress adjourned on September 2. The Gallup poll taken September 9 to 14 showed the race even 46% to 46%, with 5% undecided. But even with this loss of time, Nixon refused to abandon his promise to campaign in all 50 states. He did so and it wore him to a frazzel.



Prior to the Convention the Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Thruston Morton, had agreed the Republican nominee would debate the Democratic nominee in a series of four debates to be carried by network television. The first debate was September 26. For Nixon it was a disaster. He had not fully recovered from his illness though he had resumed campaigning. He looked gaunt, nervous and his remarks were defensive and hesitant. Kennedy, by contrast, looked well and acted in command of himself. Gallup's poll following this fiasco showed

Kennedy-Johnson	49%
Nixon-Lodge	46%
Undecided	5%

In his final poll taken October 30-November 4, Gallup reported:

Kennedy-Johnson	50.5
Nixon-Lodge	49.5

The election results were:

Kennedy-Johnson	49.7
Nixon-Lodge	49.5

Throughout his long campaign Kennedy stressed that he was the man to get this country moving again. He decried the economy, he claimed a gap in the number of missiles the US had with respect to the USSR. He called for the usual Democratic social programs. Beyond the debates, his reaction to the jailing of Martin Luther King on October 19 by a Georgia Judge for a minor traffic offense doubtless made the difference. Kennedy called Mrs. King -- more importantly Bobby Kennedy called the Judge. Nixon did and said nothing -- a fact made known to the black voters who were also well aware that Nixon refused to campaign in black areas.

Additionally, Nixon's Southern strategy was undercut when his running mate, Henry Cabot Lodge, announced in Harlem that Nixon would have a black in his Cabinet. Unfortunately, when he said this Nixon was campaigning in South Carolina.



One final point. Kennedy used his religious affiliation skillfully. In 1956 he circulated a memorandum at the Democratic convention pointing out that his Catholicism would be an advantage. During the 1960 campaign this advantage was converted to a terrible burden. He submitted to questions by the Houston Texas Minister's Association, an event which was filmed. Thereafter his campaign organization used this film on television in heavily Catholic areas following the demographics in his 1956 memo. In this way he was able to recapture the Catholic vote as follows:

East	77%
Midwest	81%
South	75%
West	74%

More significantly he brought back to the Democratic voters 62% of those Catholics who had voted for Eisenhower in 1956.



1964

The highest point Barry Goldwater reached in the Gallup polls during his campaign was 35% in interviews conducted August 27 to September 1. Gallup's final poll conducted October 25-30 showed Johnson 64%, Goldwater 29% with 7% undecided.

The election results:

Johnson	61.1%
Goldwater	38.5%

It was Goldwater's theory that because both parties had been nominating liberals, conservatives simply did not bother to vote. With a true conservative on the ticket, an hitherto "silent vote" numbering many millions would emerge. The fact that this did not show up in the polls seems to have made no difference to his supporters. Gallup polls of Goldwater vs. Kennedy or Goldwater vs. Johnson consistently showed Goldwater's support hovering at 20%.

The death of Kennedy made Goldwater's quest that much more difficult. The Southwest, which was a source of Goldwater's strength, also identified with native son, Lyndon Baines Johnson. Throughout the primaries, Goldwater lost repeatedly but won the final in California. The GOP convention was acrimonious and, the party seemed to some voters to have been taken over by fanatics.

Goldwater, using "a choice not an echo" as his slogan, campaigned in his usual blunt manner and made no effort to straddle the issues. The Democrats in their advertising campaign portrayed him as a dangerous man to trust with the button but also as a man who would take away the good things in life. Johnson, for his part was playing the role of President of all the people. When he campaigned he stressed the achievements of the Democrats and promised American boys would not be sent to fight in an Asian war. Whatever support Goldwater might have had on the war, Johnson undercut with the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and neutralized the issue of the war for the duration of the election. The Johnson landslide remains the largest in U.S. history.



1968

For a change, Republicans had the issues and the Democrats had the problems. At the end of 1967, President Johnson had the approval of only 39% of Gallup's respondents. He ran badly in the New Hampshire primary, though he won it. On the eve of the Wisconsin primary, Johnson informed the nation he would not run for re-election. The entry and near victory for Eugene McCarthy encouraged other Democrats to enter the contest. On the Republican side, Richard Nixon, in a comeback attempt, demonstrated by winning every primary, that he was electable despite his losses in 1960 and 1962. His putative opponents, George Romney and Nelson Rockefeller, withdrew before LBJ made his startling announcement. Hubert Humphrey, the eventual Democratic nominee, had remained out of the primaries and concentrated on gathering delegates in convention states. With the assassination of Robert Kennedy, the final obstacle to Humphrey's nomination was removed.

Following the assassination of Martin Luther King, there were riots in many cities, including Washington D.C. After all of this had been shown night after night, Humphrey's "politics of joy" seemed strangely inappropriate. Crime and lawlessness was already a substantial issue and next to the Vietnam issue was listed as the most important problem facing the country. Following the Democratic convention, with its riots and platform fights, Gallup reported that for the first time in many years, a majority thought the Republicans were more capable of handling the problems of the nation.

In his first trial heat following the conventions, Gallup reported the following:

Nixon	43%
Humphrey	31%
Wallace	19%
Undecided	7%

By mid-October, Humphrey was moving up in the polls. Gallup reported findings of October 17-22 were as follows:

Nixon	44%
Humphrey	36%
Wallace	15%
Undecided	5%



In his final poll, Gallup predicted the election as follows:

Nixon	42%
Humphrey	40%
Wallace	14%
Undecided	4%

The election results were:

Nixon	43.4%
Humphrey	42.7%

Nixon conducted a don't rock-the-boat campaign. He used carefully controlled television appearances for questions and answers sessions with the "voters" and made a number of radio speeches wherein he outlined his views on the issues.

Humphrey for his part was severely handicapped by LBJ on the issue of Vietnam. Almost everytime he discussed the matter, LBJ openly disagreed with him. What finally made his showing respectable was the effort by COPE to convince labor voters to support Humphrey rather than Wallace. In the final days of the campaign, LBJ announced a cease-fire but the South Vietnamese refused to agree to it. This may have given Nixon the edge. It is my view that if the election were held a day later, Humphrey probably would have won and Nixon would be remembered as "another Dewey".



.1972

This was the year for an extremist to capture the Democratic party. However, Richard Nixon was not in an assured position for re-election. His approval rating at the beginning of the year was 49%. However, his trip to China elevated this to 56%.

A host of Democrats were seeking the nomination but the early primaries eliminated all but Humphrey and McGovern. California clinched the nomination for McGovern but he was badly cut-up by Humphrey on his demogrant proposal. Moreover, because of his supporters, he was identified as the candidate of abortion, acid, and amnesty. The chaotic Democratic convention followed by the Eagleton incident kept McGovern's support in the mid thirties. Gallup's final poll gave Nixon 62%, McGovern 38%.

The election results were:

Nixon	61.8%
McGovern	38.2%

Nixon started his campaign with his trip to Peking and followed it up with a summit meeting in Moscow. Following his nomination, he campaigned very little since it was apparent McGovern was beating himself. He did make some radio speeches to provide grist for the press but for the most part, surrogates did the campaigning. McGovern bitterly resented this technique since the surrogates received equal attention. McGovern tried to make Watergate an issue but the public was not interested. Nixon, by playing the role of President, doing very Presidential things, while leaving the campaigning to others removed any target McGovern might have had making him look more incompetent than ever.





SUBJECT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE CLARK CLIFFORD  
CAMPAIGN STRATEGY MEMORANDUM

In November, 1947 Clark Clifford wrote a memorandum for Harry Truman outlining a strategy for Truman's 1948 election campaign. Clifford began the memorandum by attempting to predict the candidates and issues in the 1948 election. On the basis of a series of predictions, he then recommended a political program for the President. Clifford explained the basis for his recommendations this way:

Comments that are presented here are based solely on an appraisal of the politically advantageous course to follow. . . . It may generally be assumed that the policy that is politically wise is also the best policy for the country.


THE POLITICAL SITUATION

A. Candidates and Electoral Strategy

Clifford correctly predicted that Dewey would be the GOP nominee, and that he would be very hard to beat -- particularly if, as Clifford also correctly predicted, Wallace ran on a third party ticket. Clifford believed that the Democrats could win by holding together the Democratic alliance in the South and West, even if Truman lost the Northeast completely. Since Clifford believed that the South would never bolt, he recommended a move to the left and policies specifically designed to help the Western states ("The Winning of the West"). To Clifford, this recommendation also made sense because independent and progressive voters held the balance of power in 1948.

B. Special Interest Groups

In this section of the memorandum, Clifford tried to pinpoint th



attitudes of various special interest groups toward Truman and the issues which were likely to be of greatest concern to them. His comments were as follows:

Farmers -- Truman policies had generally been favorable to traditionally conservative farmers but, if farm prosperity returned they would be likely to go Republican and should be ignored.

Labor Unions -- The unions might be willing to support the Republicans (even after the Taft Hartley amendments!) if the Republicans passed certain laws and, even if they did not, they would need to be pushed hard to actively turn out their vote. Clifford therefore suggested a special effort be made to "stroke" labor leaders by consulting them on non-labor matters such as the Marshall plan.

"Liberals" -- The liberals had no place else to go, but needed to be activated because of their influence as opinion-makers (an "essential ally").

Blacks -- Black voters were widely believed to hold the balance of power in the Northern industrial states. Clifford saw the Democratic position with the blacks as quite weak, since the Republicans had been pushing civil rights legislation which South Democrats had bitterly opposed. The Democrats could point only to black economic progress -- a message "that...has worn a bit thin..."

Jews -- Palestine was the most important question for the Jews according to Clifford, but he saw no clear direction which a "politically advantageous" policy should take.

Catholics -- Anticommunist sentiment was the dominant issue among Catholic voters.

### C. Issues

Foreign Policy -- In Clifford's view, the issues of 1948 were to be relations with Russia and administration handling of foreign reconstruction and relief. He said:

There is considerable political advantage to the Administration in its battle with the Kremlin... The nation is already behind the President on this issue. The worse matters get, up to a fairly certain point -- real danger of imminent war -- the more there is a sense of crisis. In times of crisis, the American citizen tends to back up his President.

Clifford continued:

[T]he Republican strategy on foreign policy as it appears to be developing is a very effective one. It is effective because of its simplicity -- "everything that is good about American foreign policy is Marshall;= everything that is bad is Truman."

#### Domestic Issues: High Prices and Housing

The high cost of housing will be the most controversial issue of the 1948 campaign -- indeed the only domestic issue. Whichever party is adjudged guilty of causing it will lose the election.

On this basis, and on the basis of his view that the Administration should move to the left, Clifford recommended that the President propose a "bold" price control program.

#### ISSUES AND THE CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY

The price control proposal was part of Clifford's "congressional strategy." He wanted Truman to propose programs which Congress would never pass -- "tailored for the voter, not the Congressmen and to refuse to compromise on any issue before the Congress.

#### ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE TO THE POLITICAL SITUATION

1. Appoint a new national party chairman who can patch up the state party organizations, which are falling apart.
2. Set up a secret Presidential liaison with labor groups and progressives and invite leaders of these groups to meetings with the President;
3. Get the Progressives to attack Wallace for his Communist ties and appoint leftists to high ranking Administration positions to defuse the "Wall Street" charge.
4. Build a portrait of the President --
  - (1) Have Cabinet members talk about him in a way which reinforces public views of him as "sincere, courageous and able" and "trying to do his best."

Generally, Clifford said:



It is said, invariably...that the President is...the Symbol of Government. What the theorists as well as the politicians do not observe is that the public gets its impression of its President mostly from the actions he takes when performing as Chief of State -- as the Head of Government. They really form their lasting impressions from watching his incidental gestures -- when he appears as the representative of all the American people...He is at his best when an Ambassador of Good Will...The public has a tremendous interest in its Chief Executive and is invariably hungry for news about him. It does not want those stereotyped gestures, so ~~discouraged~~ do to death in past years that they are routine... The kind of gestures desired are those which, taken altogether and repeated again and again, will form a carefully drawn picture of the President as a broad-gauged citizen with tremendously varied interests... One or two non-political personages a week should be the target... But he will need to do something of this nature for an entirely extraneous -- and much more valid -- reason: Since he is President, he cannot be politically active until well after the July Convention. The people are inconsistent and capricious but there is no argument that they feel deeply on this -- he must be President of all the people and not merely the leader of a party, until the very last minute

So a President who is also a candidate must resort to subterfuge, for he cannot sit silent... He must do the kind of thing suggested above to stay in the limelight and he must also resort to the kind of trip which Roosevelt made famous in the 1940 campaign -- the "inspection tour." No matter how much opposition and press pointed out the political overtones of the trips, the people paid little attention...

5. Foreign policy -- Clifford said:

Today the American people identify Secretary Marshall, and not the President, as our spokesman.

Therefore:

- (1) The President must use his authority publicly, by speaking
- (2) State Department announcements should be made through the White House.
- (3) The President should make announcements now made by the Defense Department so that he is perceived more clearly in his role as Commander in Chief.

Domestic Issues

- (1) The price control program should be given high priority;
- (2) Housing is next priority after food prices -- make the "Real Estate lobby" the enemy the way the "Public Utility

Lobby" was the enemy in 1935; try to push Congress and the ~~the~~ Justice Department to investigate them -- put together a Special Message to Congress on Housing.

(3) The President should try to create an image of himself as an "imaginative leader" (as Henry Wallace has done), perhaps by presenting a plan for America through 1960.

#### 6. Mechanics

A think tank should be set up secretly to report to the President on a monthly basis as to political progress and strategy and to handle platform drafting and the 10 major campaign speeches after the Convention. The Committees' work would allow same day response to Republican charges.



C - Analysis of  
Catholic Vote



Note to Researchers:

None of the copies of the campaign strategy plan received by the Ford Library included the paper on the Catholic vote that was supposed to be at this tab.

William H. McNitt  
Gerald R. Ford Library  
August 23, 2004


D - Carter's Lead



# The Election Could Be Close

Despite Jimmy Carter's wide lead over Gerald Ford and Ronald Reagan in all the national polls, Americans are far from sold on the Georgian as their next President. Doubts about him persist even among registered Democrats: while 47% are satisfied with him as their party's nominee, 44% would prefer someone else. Thus the election may be far closer than predicted, particularly if the Republicans nominate Ford, who is far more popular among the voters than Reagan. This is the chief message of a nationwide telephone poll of 1,007 registered voters conducted for TIME from June 21 to 24 by Yankelovich, Skelly and White, Inc., an opinion-research firm.


The survey found that Carter's lead over Reagan has widened since the early primaries. If the election were held today, Carter would trounce him by 51% to 31%, up from 46% to 36% in a poll in March. But Carter's edge over Ford has remained almost the same since late



April, 47% to 38%. The reason seems to be Carter's failure to overcome the antagonism of many Democrats and independents, particularly those who have liberal views on the issues.

Among the Democrats and independents who would like next week's convention to nominate someone else, 62% regard Carter's positions as fuzzy, and 58% believe that he changes them depending on his audience. More than a third of this group fault him for lack of experience in national office, and 40% feel that he does not understand regions of the country outside the South. By contrast, there is not much concern about Carter's evangelical religious beliefs or his sense of humor.

Five possible Democratic nominees for Vice President, Senator Frank Church of Idaho emerged as the most popular, followed by Senators Adlai Stevenson of Illinois, Walter Mondale of Minnesota and John Glenn of Ohio and Governor Michael Dukakis of Massa-




chusetts. A net of 14% of those polled said they would be more likely to vote for Carter if Church were on the ticket; any one of the other four men made much less difference to them. Church would strengthen Carter in those regions where he needs help the most: the West and Midwest.

On the Republican side, the poll found that Reagan's aggressive campaign has cut into Ford's support among the party's rank and file; he now leads Reagan among Republicans 53% to 36%, down from 65% to 27% in April. Reagan has also persuaded significant numbers of voters that Ford is "too soft" on the Russians (a view held by 45% of all voters interviewed), has no program for the country (38%), and has been a weak President (37%). Moreover, 45% are still upset about Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon.

But Ford remained a much stronger potential candidate than Reagan, even in the Sunbelt states. For example, in the West, Ford's support was almost the same as Carter's (42% to 44%), while Reagan trailed the Georgian 37% to 46%. In the Midwest, Ford led Carter, 43% to 41%, but Reagan was far behind Carter, 34% to 47%.

Large numbers of voters also have



serious reservations about Reagan. Among them: 40% feel he does not understand foreign policy; 37% fear that he might get the U.S. into a war. Moreover, the poll suggested that many Republicans will defect to Carter if Reagan becomes the nominee. Among Republicans who back Ford, only 36% say that Reagan would be an acceptable nominee. In contrast, 64% of Reagan's supporters regard Ford as an acceptable candidate if the Californian loses the nomination.

For many Republicans, the best solution would be to have both candidates on the same ticket; 37% say that they would be more likely to vote for Ford if Reagan is his running mate, even though Reagan insists there is "no way" that he would run with Ford. Asked about four other possible nominees as Vice President, Republicans ranked Senator Howard Baker of Tennessee as their second choice, followed by Commerce Secretary Elliot Richardson, former Treasury Secretary John Connally and Vice President Nelson Rockefeller. But Baker and Richardson made a Republican ticket more attractive to the important independent voters, while the idea of Reagan, Connally or Rockefeller as a vice-presidential candidate turned them off. The survey found that none of the possible choices for Vice President would strengthen a Republican ticket headed by Reagan.

**Upbeat Mood.** Though Republican voters prefer a Ford-Reagan ticket, the poll showed that among all voters such a pairing would run behind a Carter-Church ticket 39% to 47%. That would be about the same outcome as a hypothetical contest between Ford and Carter without running mates.

If Ford gets the nomination, his chances of winning the election will depend largely on whether he can persuade Americans that the economy is really improving. Of those questioned, 44% now rank the economy as a more important issue than "moral leadership"; 35% thought it was the other way around. Inflation worries 47% of those surveyed; only 23% are deeply disturbed about unemployment, down seven points since April. The economy and leadership rank far ahead of all others as the most important issues, including crime (12%), taxes (8%), Big Government (6%), busing (4%), the Middle East (3%), pollution (2%), racial problems (2%) and the oil companies (1%).

A composite of questions designed to measure the national mood found that the proportion of Americans who feel things are going well in the country and are optimistic about the future has leveled off since March at 34%. Ford obviously is not getting across his message that the nation has rebounded from war, Watergate and recession. If he does so, and if he wins the nomination, he could make the election a horse race. Among voters in an upbeat mood, he runs ahead of Carter 53% to 35%.